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Abstract
We consider a decentralized, multilayered representative democracy, where citi-
zens participate in deliberative policy formation after self-organizing into a pyramidal
hierarchy of small groups. Each group elects a delegate, who expresses the deliber-
ative consensus of that group at the next tier of the pyramid. The pyramid thus
acts as a communications network which efficiently aggregates useful information
and policy ideas. It is also a powerful meritocratic device, which channels legislative
responsibility towards the most committed and competent citizens. This yields a
practical implementation of deliberative democracy in a large polity.
‘Deliberative democracy’ emphasizes the importance of widespread dialogue and de-
liberation amongst the citizenry as an essential part of the democratic process.1 Such
deliberation should have many positive effects. It would yield superior legislation by elicit-
ing and efficiently aggregating the knowledge, creativity, and analytical skills of the entire
electorate. It would also encourage compromise and consensus-formation, yielding leg-
islation with broader public support and greater legitimacy. However, there are several
practical difficulties in implementing the deliberative ideal:
1. Scale: In a polity with tens of millions of citizens, how can we give each citizen an
opportunity to meaningfully participate in deliberative policy formation, while still
creating a relatively efficient and effective legislative process?
2. Competency: Citizens differ hugely in their legislative competency, due to widely
varying levels of education (both formal and informal)2, intelligence, engagement in
the current political discourse, and overall interest in public policy. Unstructured
1See e.g. Fishkin (1991, 1997), Gutmann and Thompson (1996, 2004), Bohman and Rehg (1997), Elster
(1998b), Dryzek (2002), Fishkin and Laslett (2003), Amsler (2004), or Ba¨chtiger and Steiner (2005a,b).
2See Kuklinski et al. (2000) or Delli-Carpini and Keeter (1996) for studies of voter ignorance or misin-
formation. See Somin (1998, 2004) or Weinshall (2003) for the ‘public ignorance’ criticism of deliberative
democracy.
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deliberation in random or self-assembled groups generally gives disproportionate in-
fluence to the most vociferous, confident, and charismatic speakers, who are not
necessarily the best qualified to formulate public policy. If deliberation is to en-
hance the quality of legislation, then there must be meritocratic mechanisms which
promote the most competent (i.e. intelligent, educated, informed, engaged, ethical,
objective, pragmatic, and open-minded) participants, instead of favoring ideologues,
extremists, and demagogues.
3. Time Commitment: To seriously participate in deliberation, a citizen must acquire
and maintain the relevant background knowledge, and then evaluate, critique, and
perhaps author policy proposals, while discussing them with fellow citizens. This is
a full-time job (at least), and most citizens are too busy with their ordinary lives to
participate conscientiously. As a result, they will either participate in a superficial
(perhaps counterproductive) manner, or altogether opt out of deliberation.3
Some deliberative proposals4 address these problems by relegating deliberation to a
purely ‘educational’ or ‘advisory’ role, adjunct to existing electoral institutions. In these
models, deliberation is intended to produce more informed, open-minded, cosmopolitan,
rational, and critical citizens, who then vote more intelligently in conventional elections
or referenda. However, the alternatives in these elections and referenda would still be
determined by conventional political parties or legislatures, so this is still a ‘top-down’
legislative system. Ultimately, citizens affect legislation only by voting, influencing other
citizens’ votes, and perhaps sending non-binding policy advice to legislators.
Some proposals [e.g. deliberative polls (Fishkin, 1991, 1997), minipopuli (Dahl, 1989,
p.340) or citizen’s juries (Coote and Lenaghan 1997, Jefferson Center 1999)] also address
Problem #1 by restricting formal deliberation to relatively small, random samples of cit-
izens, which are intended to be ‘statistically representative’ of the general population
(Goodin (2003) calls this ‘ersatz deliberation’). Also, some proposals address Problem #3
by limiting formal deliberation to brief, infrequent, concentrated sessions. For example,
Fishkin’s deliberative polls occur over a single weekend, and the aforementioned ‘random
sampling’ methodology presumably means that most citizens would only participate in
one every few years. Fishkin and Ackerman (2005) suggest limiting formal deliberation
to a single national holiday, one week before major elections (although this ‘Deliberation
Day’ is also intended to elicit informal deliberation amongst the electorate both before and
afterwards).
However, to fully realize the potential of deliberative democracy, we need a deliberative
institution which allows the entire electorate to continually and substantively participate in
the legislative process, while somehow obviating the three aforementioned practical prob-
lems. Pyramidal democracy (PD) is a decentralized, multilayered form of representative
democracy which achieves this goal by arranging the electorate in a hierarchical network of
small, self-organized, deliberative groups. This allows the whole electorate to meaningfully
participate in deliberation and policy formation, but also allows each citizen to voluntarily
3See Warren (1996) for another discussion of Problems #2 and #3.
4See Ryfe (2002) for a survey of contemporary deliberative organizations.
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limit her time commitment by delegating some (or most) of her deliberative responsibilities
to an elected representative. The resulting ‘pyramid’ of delegation is a powerful merito-
cratic mechanism which channels legislative responsibility towards the most committed
and competent citizens. The pyramid also acts as a communications network which ef-
ficiently aggregates useful information and policy ideas from all citizens, while naturally
filtering out fallacy, misinformation and extremism. Formally, pyramidal democracy works
as follows:
1. Citizens self-organize into groups (called nodes), each containing a minimum number
B of members (we suggest B = 7, but we expect most nodes will be slightly larger,
so as to be more stable). We assume people will form nodes based upon similarity
of political views and values. The totality of all such nodes is called Tier 1 of the
pyramid.
2. The members of each node meet regularly to deliberate. Each node selects a single
delegate, who will represent the consensus positions of that node on various issues.
3. The delegates of all Tier 1 nodes themselves self-organize into nodes, each containing
at least B members. The totality of all such nodes is called Tier 2 of the pyramid.
4. The members of each Tier 2 node meet regularly to deliberate. Each Tier 2 node
chooses a single delegate to represent its consensus positions.
5. These Tier 2 delegates then self-organize into nodes, each containing at least B
members. The totality of these nodes is Tier 3 of the pyramid.
6. We iterate this process. Clearly, in a society with K voters, the nth tier will have
at most K/Bn−1 nodes. We stop when we reach a tier with less than B2 members;
thus the pyramid will have at most logB(K) tiers. (For example, if B = 10, then a
pyramid with K = 100 000 000 voters would have at most seven tiers; the top Tier
would have at most 100 members, each indirectly representing a six-tier sub-pyramid
with at least 10 000 000 voters.)
7. The top Tier (called the Parliament) will contain between B and B2 individuals, and
will be the legislative branch of the government.
The structure of delegation in the pyramid is fairly elaborate. Two technical remarks
are in order:
(a) Each member of a Tier (k+1) node Nk+1 is the delegate from some Tier k node Nk,
and is tasked with representing the position of Nk in Nk+1. However, she must also
be given considerable discretion to modify her views during deliberation in Nk+1.
Presumably, the delegates to Tier (k+ 1) will generally be the most serious and
politically engaged members of Tier k; hence the quality and quantity of deliberation
will be much greater in Tier (k+1) than in Tier k. Beyond some Tier (say Tier
4), deliberation will become a serious time commitment, and members should be
3
Tier 4
Tier 3
Tier 2
Tier 1
to
 T
ier
 5
back to Tier 3
Figure 1: A fragment of a pyramidal democracy. For simplicity we depict nodes with four voting
members. Circles are node members, and polygons are nodes. Light grey circles are ordinary members
(who can vote). Black circles are delegates (who cannot vote in their home node). Dark grey circles are
metadelegates (who can vote). Solid lines represent delegacy, and dashed lines represent metadelegacy.
entitled to part-time release from their ordinary jobs, and commensurate financial
compensation (in an electorate of 100 000 000, Tier 4 might contain around 100 000
people). In Parliament and the Tier just below it, deliberation will be a full-time
job; members of Parliament and the sub-Parliamentary Tier should be be paid as
full-time civil servants.
(b) Suppose that a Tier (k+1) nodeNk+1 chooses member D as its delegate to Tier (k+2).
Recall that D is already the delegate to Nk+1 from some Tier k node Nk; presumably,
D cannot fulfil both delegacy roles simultaneously. Thus, another member D′ must
be chosen from Nk to act as Nk’s delegate in Nk+1. If Nk+1 must vote on some issue,
then D′ votes on behalf of Nk, and D casts no vote. (Note that D is still a voting
member of Nk —she simply no longer representsNk within Nk+1). For terminological
clarity, we will say that D is a ‘metadelegate’ of Nk.
Figure 1 portrays a fragment of a this structure. Versions of pyramidal democracy have
been proposed by Arendt (1965, p.278) and MacPherson (1977; §V(4A), p.108). A four-tier
version, called the “communication tree”, was a key feature of MINERVA, an experiment in
electronically-mediated democracy in the early 1970’s.5 For the last decade, a three-tier
form of pyramidal democracy (called Participatory Democracy) has been a central part
of a system of ‘participatory civic planning’ in many cities in Brazil, starting with Porto
Alegre.6 Indeed, the United States Electoral College was originally intended as a three-tier
5See Etzioni (1971; §II.2) and Etzioni et al. (1975).
6See Santos (1998), Marquetti (2000), Fung and Wright (2001; §I.4), Lieberherr (2003), and Aragone`s
and Sa´nchez-Page´s (2005).
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pyramidal democracy (the third tier being the President), although in reality it functions
nothing like this.
However, our proposal is somewhat different than these earlier models, because it in-
volves more tiers, smaller nodes, and a more fluid structure. In particular:
• The purpose of each node is to share knowledge and ideas, and to build consensus
through dialogue. Thus, each node must be small enough that intelligent multilateral
dialogue is possible; say around seven to ten people. For this reason we propose
setting B := 7. (In contrast, the earlier pyramid models involved only three or four
tiers, with nodes containing hundreds or thousands of people).
• Node membership is entirely voluntary. Citizens choose a node based on ideological
affinity, rather than being assigned a node based on geographical proximity. Further-
more, a member can “defect” from a node at any time if she is dissatisfied with the
consensus position of that node. (However, until she joins another node, the defector
is effectively voiceless in the political process).
• Delegates can be replaced at any time. If they are dissatisfied with her performance,
the members of a Tier k node Nk can recall their delegate from Tier (k + 1) and
replace her with a new delegate. (However, if D is a metadelegate from Nk to a Tier
(j + 1) node Nj+1 for some j > k, then Nk cannot recall D, because D is no longer
the official representative of Nk. Only the intermediary Tier j node Nj can recall D,
because D is actually Nj’s delegate).
In §1, we will argue that the pyramid acts as a meritocratic selection device, whereby the
most competent individuals will naturally rise to higher tiers and hence acquire greater
political influence. In §2, we will examine the stability of the pyramid. Finally, §3 contains
some miscellaneous observations about this proposal.
1 Pyramidal Meritocracy
In a representative democracy, the delegate chosen to represent each constituency should
be the most competent candidate —i.e. the most intelligent, knowledgeable, ethical and
dedicated. However, conventional electoral systems often fall far short of this ideal, for
several reasons:
(C1) Electoral success depends on advertising, and advertising requires a lot of money,
so conventional elections heavily favor the interests of the wealthy.7 Political par-
ties have emerged as the most efficient way to obtain and deploy campaign funds,
so they now entirely control the nomination process. Thus, candidates are drawn
from a small, exclusive clique of party apparatchiks, and are selected not for their
competency, but for their charisma, ‘electability’, and partisan loyalty.
7The influence of political advertising (and thus, campaign financing) on elections has been exten-
sively studied; see Morton and Cameron (1992), Austen-Smith (1997), and (Mueller, 2003, §20.2-20.3) for
summaries.
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(C2) In a conventional election, a voter is generally presented with very few (e.g. two or
three) candidates, who represent widely different ideologies. Of these, she finds an
even smaller number (e.g. one or less) ideologically palatable. Thus, after accounting
for ideology, she is left with no discretion to optimize on the basis of the candidate’s
competency.
(C3) Voters have no opportunity for long-term personal interaction with the candidates.
Instead, voters base their opinions on campaign advertising, television soundbites
and the facile ‘analysis’ of media pundits.
(C4) Even if [despite (C1)-(C3)], voters had a wide variety of candidates to choose from,
and easy access to abundant and accurate information about each one, many voters
would still make ignorant and irrational decisions [see e.g. Schumpeter (1942 [1976])].
(C5) Furthermore, voters are usually too apathetic to correct these deficiencies, because
of what Downs (1957) calls ‘rational ignorance’. Voters have little incentive to spend
time and money to become better educated or informed, for the same reason that
they have little incentive to vote in the first place: because each voter knows that
her vote has only an infinitesimal effect on the outcome of the election, and even less
influence on public policy.
(C6) Even if, despite reasons (C1)-(C5), a conventional election somehow acted as a
mechanism to select high-quality candidates, conventional electoral systems involve
only one ‘iteration’ of this mechanism.
Condorcet’s (1785) Jury Theorem8 is sometimes invoked to argue that majority vote
will pick the best candidate. However, the Jury Theorem is inapplicable for three reasons:
• The Jury Theorem assumes that each voter has a probability greater than 50% to
pick the best candidate. This is far from clear, especially in light of reasons (C2)-(C5)
above.
• The Jury Theorem models the voters’ choices as independent random variables —i.e.
the voters make their decisions entirely independently of one another. This is clearly
false: voters discuss politics extensively with one another prior to voting, and they
are all inundated by the same torrent of propaganda and punditry, so their choices
are highly correlated.
• Even if its hypotheses were satisfied, the Jury Theorem implies that a majority
vote will choose the best option from a given ballot of alternatives. In conventional
representative democracy, this ballot is assembled by political parties, so in light of
(C1), the candidates on the ballot are not necessarily of high competency.
In contrast, pyramidal democracy should do a much better job of selecting the most
competent candidates for Parliament, for the following six reasons:
8See §6.1 of Mueller (2003).
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(P1) PD is economically egalitarian: everyone has equal opportunity to rise to higher tiers
of the pyramid, regardless of her wealth or political connections. There is no longer
any role for campaign financing, because there are no longer any election campaigns.
Instead of being indispensable sources of campaign funds, parties will revert to their
original role as mere debating clubs or advocacy groups, with no real political clout.
(P2) Nodes are ideologically homogeneous (except perhaps at the very top tiers), because
they self-organize on the basis of ideological affinity. Thus, the delegacy candidates
in each node are ideologically similar, so that the choice amongst them will be made
primarily based on competency, not ideology.
(P3) Each delegacy candidate is extremely well-known to her ‘constituents’ (i.e. fellow
node members), because they have discussed policy and personally interacted with
her over a long period. Hence, presumably, these constituents can make a well-
informed choice, and choose the most competent candidate as their delegate.
(P4) Because of reasons (P1)-(P3), the delegates who appear in Tier 2 will generally be
the most competent members of the Tier 1 population. Likewise, those in Tier 3
will generally be the most competent members of Tier 2. Inductively, each successive
Tier will generally contain the most competent members of the previous Tier. The
more competent the members of a Tier become, the more willing and able they will
be to choose the most competent candidates amongst themselves to ascend to the
next Tier.
(P5) Furthermore, each voter has a strong incentive to educate herself and vote intelli-
gently, because her vote has a clear and significant influence on the decisions made
by her node. It is no longer ‘rational’ to be ignorant.
(P6) To the extent that delegate election is a mechanism which selects high-competency
candidates, pyramidal democracy involves several iterations of this mechanism, and
each iteration further winnows the pool of candidates. Suppose we disregard reasons
(P1)-(P5) and suppose that nodes are no better at choosing their delegates than
conventional elections are at choosing legislators; even then, multiple iterations of
this process will still improve the outcome.
To illustrate these arguments with a simple mathematical model, we make the following
simplifying assumptions:
(A1) Each candidate’s intelligence, education, creativity, integrity, etc. is aggregated into
a single real number, which we call the competency of that candidate. Candidates
with higher competency are preferable to those with lower competency.
(A2) All voters have the same notion of competency —i.e. all voters place the same
relative importance on personal traits such as intelligence, integrity, etc.
(A3) The competency levels over the population are distributed according to a probability
distribution with probability density function g : R−→R.
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(A4) Each constituency tries to select the most competent candidate; thus candidates
of higher competency are more likely to be chosen than those of lower competency.
However, because of imperfect information, there is always nonzero probability that
a low-competency candidate will be chosen instead of a high-competency candidate.
We assume there is some nondecreasing function f : R−→R such that f(x) is the
conditional probability density that a candidate will be elected, given that her com-
petency level is x.
The function f describes the ‘efficacy’ of the electoral process in choosing a high-
competency candidate. If f(x) = 1 for all x, then the electoral process is totally blind
to competency. If f is increasing, then the process favors higher-competency candidates.
The more rapidly f increases, the more effective the process becomes at choosing the most
competent candidate.
Let k :=
∫∞
−∞ f(x)g(x) dx. Then given assumptions (A1)-(A4), the competency of the
elected candidate will be a random variable with density function h(x) := f(x)g(x)/k. For
example, suppose that g(x) is a Gaussian distribution with mean µ and variance σ2. Let
α > 0, and suppose that f(x) = eαx. (Thus, a larger value of α represents an electoral
system which is better at picking high-competency candidates.) Then f(x)g(x) = k h(x),
where k := eα(µ+σ
2/2) and where h(x) is a Gaussian distribution with variance σ2 and mean
µ+ σ2α. In other words, the mean competency of elected delegates is σ2α higher than the
mean competency of the general population.
Our choice of a Gaussian for g is quite natural, but our choice for f is somewhat
artificial. Nevertheless, this example illustrates a general principle: the more rapidly the
function f increases, the higher will be the average competency of the elected candidates.
Let f0 : R−→R describe the ‘efficacy’ of conventional elections. Then arguments (C1)-
(C5) above suggest that f will be, at best, slowly increasing. Let f1 : R−→R describe
the efficacy of the delegate elections in the first Tier of the pyramid. We have insufficient
information to posit a specific expression for f0 or f1,
9 but arguments (P1)-(P5) suggest
that f1 will be more rapidly increasing than f0. Now, for all k > 1, let fk describe the
efficacy of the delegate selection process at the kth Tier. Then argument (P4) suggests
that f2 will increase more rapidly than f1, because the mean level of competency in Tier
2 will be higher than that in Tier 1, and hence, Tier 2 voters will be even more capable
of selecting the most competent candidates amongst themselves. Likewise, f3 will increase
even more rapidly than f2, and so on.
The competency distribution of conventional election winners is given by the density
h(x) := f(x)g(x)/k, as described above. In contrast, the competency distribution of the
Parliament in an eight-tier pyramidal democracy will be described by the density H(x) :=
f7(x)f6(x) · · · f2(x)f1(x)g(x)/K, where K :=
∫∞
−∞ f7(x)f6(x) · · · f2(x)f1(x)g(x) dx.
For example, suppose fk(x) = e
αkx for all k. Then the previous argument implies that
α7 ≥ α6 ≥ · · · ≥ α2 ≥ α1 > α0. Assuming an initially Gaussian distribution with mean 0
and variance σ2, the mean competency of a conventional election winner is σ2α0. However,
9However, see Huckfeldt (2001) for an interesting empirical study of subjective estimates of ‘political
competency’ in deliberative settings.
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the mean competency of the pyramidal Parliament is σ2(α1 +α2 + · · ·+α7), which is more
than seven times as large.
2 Stability
Pyramidal democracy is extremely fluid and responsive to the electorate. At any time, a
dissatisfied node can replace its delegate. A dissatisfied voter can defect from a node, and
too many defections can force the node to dissolve. This fluidity and responsiveness is an
asset, but it can also lead to excessive political instability: it is possible for a ‘cascade’
of delegate replacements or defections/dissolutions to propagate up the hierarchy of the
pyramid. We will now construct a simple mathematical model to study this problem.
Delegate Replacement. We first distinguish between two kinds of delegate replace-
ment. An endogenous replacement occurs when the majority of the members of a node
become dissatisfied with their delegate and replace her. In a node N in Tier 2 or higher,
there can also be exogenous replacements: this occurs when one or more members of N
(each being a delegate from a lower tier) are themselves replaced, and this changes the
balance of power in N so as to precipitate an immediate delegate replacement in N . We
make the following assumptions:
(a) In any single node n, the endogenous replacement of delegates is a continuous-time
Poisson process with some rate vn > 0, where vn measures the endogenous political
‘volatility’ of node n. (Nodes with higher volatilities replace their delegates more fre-
quently.) The endogenous replacements in distinct nodes are independent processes.
(b) The volatilities of all nodes are independent random variables. The volatilities of all
nodes in Tier t have the same distribution, with mean vt.
(c) Whenever a node at Tier t replaces its delegate, there is a probability αt > 0 that
this triggers an exogenous replacement event in the next higher tier.
If N2 is a Tier 2 node, then assumptions (a)-(c) imply that the delegate replacements (both
endogenous and exogenous) in N obey a Poisson process with rate
v∗N := vN + α1
∑
n∈N
vn. (1)
Inductively, suppose N is a Tier T node. For all t ∈ {1, . . . , T−1}, let Nt be the set of all
Tier t nodes below N . Then the replacements in N obey a Poisson process with rate v∗N ,
where v∗N is defined inductively by:
v∗N = vN + αt−1
∑
n∈Nt−1
v∗n = · · · · · · (2)
= vN + αt−1
∑
n∈Nt−1
vn + (αt−1αt−2)
∑
n∈Nt−2
vn + · · ·+ (αt−1 · · ·α2α1)
∑
n∈N1
vn.
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Let N be the average node size, suppose the pyramid has T tiers below the Parliament,
and suppose α1 ≈ α2 ≈ · · · ≈ αT−1 ≈ α for some constant α. If N is a Tier T node (i.e.
its delegate is in Parliament), then the Law of Large Numbers says we can approximate
eqn.(2) by
v∗N ≈ vN + αN vT−1 + α2N2 vT−2 + · · · + αT−1NT−1 v1. (3)
For example, suppose v1 ≈ v2 ≈ · · · ≈ vT ≈ v for some constant v. In equation (3), if
α 1/N , then v∗N ≈ v for any nodeN —all nodes about equally volatile. If α = 1/N , then
v∗N ≈ Tv. However, if α > 1/N , then V∗N ≈ (αC)T−1v1, so Tier T nodes are exponentially
more volatile than Tier 1 nodes.
Thus, the membership of Parliament will be reasonably stable as long as α1, . . . , αT−1
and v1, . . . , vT are small enough. To ensure this, we suggest the following policies:
• A Tier t node must wait Mt days before replacing its delegate. (This introduces a
‘cooling period’, during which time a reconciliation might occur). Increasing Mt will
decrease vt.
• When a Tier t node replaces its delegate, there is an Nt day ‘initiation period’ during
which the new delegate cannot vote in the higher tier. (Thus, the node is ‘penalized’
for replacing its delegate, by being disenfranchised for Nt days; this discourages
capricious replacement of delegates). Increasing Nt will decrease both vt and αt.
M1, . . . ,MT and N1, . . . , NT are control parameters with which to ‘tune’ the stability of
the pyramid. If the pyramid exhibits too many delegate replacements in Tier t, then we
can decrease vt and/or αt by increasing Mt and/or Nt. (However, it is important that Mt
and Nt still be kept as small as possible, to maximize the accountability of delegates to
their constituents).
Defection and Dissolution. If (through defection) a node ever drops below the mini-
mum size B, then it has a very short ‘grace period’ (e.g. 30 days) to replace the defector(s)
and satisfy the minimum size requirement —otherwise the node is dissolved, and its mem-
bers must join other nodes or be disenfranchised. To create a safety cushion against such
a ‘membership crisis’, most nodes will probably choose to have an excess of members over
the minimum B (so that no single member can extort concessions by threatening to de-
fect). For example, if B = 7, then most nodes would probably have nine or ten members.
There is no maximum size to nodes. However, increasing the size of a node dilutes the
effective political power of each member, so members have an interest in keeping nodes
small. Thus, the size of the node represents a trade-off between greater influence for each
member, versus greater stability for the node as a whole.
If a Tier 1 node dissolves due to a membership crisis, then its delegate immediately
leaves the corresponding Tier 2 node; this could compromise the viability of the Tier 2
node, leading to its dissolution, and so forth. We call this scenario a dissolution cascade.
Clearly, a high frequency of dissolution cascades could compromise the stability of the
pyramid.
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A node can dissolve in two ways. An endogenous dissolution occurs when some member
defects, reducing the node’s population below B, and the node is unable to replace the
defector within the grace period. A node N in Tier 2 or higher can also suffer exogenous
dissolution: this occurs when some member D of N is a delegate from a lower-tier node n,
and the node n dissolves, so that D must immediately leave N , reducing N ’s population
below B and indirectly causing the dissolution of N as well.
Suppose the population of each node fluctuates according to a stationary, continuous
time Markov process. Then the dissolution of each node occurs according to a Poisson
process. We make the following assumptions:
(a) The endogenous dissolution of node n occurs according to a continuous-time Poisson
process with some rate vn > 0, where vn measures the endogenous political ‘volatility’
of node n. (Nodes with higher volatilities are more likely to dissolve.) The endogenous
dissolutions of distinct nodes are independent processes.10
(b) The volatilities of all nodes are independent random variables. The volatilities of all
nodes in Tier t have the same distribution, with mean vt.
(c) Whenever a node at Tier t dissolves, there is a probability αt > 0 that this triggers
an exogenous dissolution in the next higher tier.
Clearly, this yields a mathematical model of which is formally identical to the previ-
ous model of delegate replacement. The conclusion is the same: as long as the values
α1, . . . , αT−1 and v1, . . . , vT are small enough, dissolution cascades will be rare events, and
the pyramid will be relatively stable. To make these values small enough, we suggest the
following policies:
• As suggested above, if the population of a Tier t node drops below B, then this
node has a ‘grace period’ of Lt days to recruit new members before it is dissolved.
Increasing Lt decreases vt; if t ≥ 2, then it also decreases αt−1.
• A Tier t node member must wait Mt days before defecting. (This introduces a
‘cooling period’, during which time a reconciliation might occur; it also gives the
node time to find a replacement for the defector). Increasing Mt decreases vt.
• If a Tier t node member defects, there is an Nt day period before the defector can join
a new node. (Thus, the defector is ‘penalized’ for defecting, by being disenfranchised
for Nt days; this discourages capricious defections). Increasing Nt decreases vt
If the pyramid exhibits too many dissolutions in Tier t, then we can decrease vt and/or αt
by increasing Lt, Mt and/or Nt. (However, it is important that these parameters be kept
as small as possible, to grant citizens maximal mobility to migrate between nodes).
10This is somewhat unrealistic: defections and dissolutions may occur in response to a polity-wide
controversy or crisis, which would simultaneously impact many nodes.
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3 Concluding remarks
Suffrage. It is generally acknowledged that children and mentally infirm adults should
not vote. Presumably, they should not participate in other deliberative institutions either.
However, any legal distinction between ‘child’ and ‘adult’ or between ‘firm’ and ‘infirm’
is arbitrary and leads to intellectually indefensible inconsistencies. For example, in many
western democracies, the voting age is eighteen; yet there certainly exist thoughtful, well-
informed, politically engaged youths who may be more competent to vote than many
ignorant, politically apathetic adults. Presumably, the age of eighteen is chosen to roughly
coincide with the completion of high school. However, an adult who quit school in grade
nine can still vote; indeed, even functionally illiterate and innumerate adults have the
franchise, and any proposal to restrict suffrage to people with some minimum educational
level is regarded as highly undemocratic. The distinction between mentally ‘firm’ and
‘infirm’ (as decided by a psychiatrist) is even more subjective and ambiguous, and transfers
troubling political power to the psychiatric profession.
Pyramidal democracy provides a natural solution to this problem. We can allow all
citizens —even children and the mentally infirm —to participate in Tier 1 of the pyramid
(perhaps in familial nodes). The meritocratic mechanisms discussed in §1 will naturally
identify incompetent voters and curtail their political influence. Presumably children and
the mentally infirm will not be chosen as delegates to Tier 2. However, by participating in
Tier 1, these citizens can still communicate their needs and wishes through their delegate,
and thus we ensure that society takes these needs into account in legislation.
Bargaining and Consensus. In a conventional majority/plurality vote, it is possible
for a large minority (or even a majority) to be strongly dissatisfied with the outcome. This
undermines the legitimacy of the decision and may lead to problems with implementation
and compliance. Representative democracies using plurality vote are also vulnerable to
many ‘voting paradoxes’, such as Anscombe’s (1976) and Ostrogorski’s (1902) Paradoxes
(Nurmi, 1998, 1999). To address these problems, a variety of elaborate voting systems
have been proposed (e.g. Borda count, transferable votes, approval voting). However, any
voting system, no matter how elaborate, is vulnerable to inconsistent and pathological
outcomes (by Arrow’s Impossibility Theorem) and is manipulable by ‘strategic voters’
(by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem).11 Voting systems are also prone to ‘Condorcet
cycles’, creating political instability and possible manipulation through agenda control.12
In the sub-parliamentary nodes of the pyramid, however, we imagine that most political
decisions (e.g. the choice of delegate, the endorsement of certain policy proposals) will not
be made by voting. Instead, they will be made through a process of deliberation and
bargaining leading to unanimous or near-unanimous consensus. This is for two reasons:
1. Each node is very small (e.g. ten people) so multilateral discussion and negotiation
is entirely feasible. In a small group, it is possible to continuously deploy new pro-
11See (Riker, 1982, Ch.5-6) or (Mueller, 2003, Ch.24) for a summary of these results.
12See (Riker, 1982, Ch.7), (Austen-Smith and Banks, 1999, Ch.6), or (Mueller, 2003, §5.12.1) for a
summary.
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posals which creatively compromise between conflicting positions, until a mutually
acceptable arrangement is found.
2. Node membership is voluntary; a dissatisfied member can ‘defect’ at any time.
Reason #2 means that a node member will not be satisfied if she is out-voted on an
important issue; she will defect to some other node more congenial to her views. Thus, on
every issue, each node must struggle to achieve a consensus which is at least tolerable to
all its members, or the node will cease to exist. Fortunately, Reason #1 means that this
struggle can usually succeed.
Of course, unanimous consensus is sometimes impossible, because the individual posi-
tions are too divergent. This becomes more likely at higher tiers of the pyramid, where
nodes must bring together delegates with increasingly different views. Furthermore, each
delegate is constrained to represent the consensus position of her constituency, and may
only have limited discretion to compromise. Consensus is also less likely for urgent deci-
sions which leave no time for negotiations. Finally, on some issues, there is an exogenous,
finite ballot of alternatives, and it is not possible to introduce new alternatives through
‘creative compromise’. Nevertheless, on most decisions in sub-parliamentary nodes, we
expect to see supermajoritarian support, often approaching unanimity. Supermajoritar-
ian decisions are far less likely to exhibit voting paradoxes13, and are less vulnerable to
Condorcet cycles14.
Reason #2 ceases to be applicable in Parliament. Here, defection is not an option,
so some decisions may ultimately be decided by voting, possibly irritating of a large mi-
nority. However, even in this context, Reason #1 still applies. Furthermore, deliberation
may make Arrovian pathologies less likely, by encouraging the formation of ‘single-peaked’
preferences.15
Public vs. private deliberation. Public deliberation (i.e. in front of an audience)
tends to be superficial, adversarial and demagogic. It also makes compromise difficult,
because it is embarrassing for speakers to admit mistakes or modify their position; see e.g.
Stasavage (2007). Private deliberation allows serious, honest discussion without rhetorical
theatrics; however it also creates the possibility for corruption, collusion, and cooption;
see e.g. (Gutmann and Thompson, 1996, Ch.3). The best deliberative institution would
require both private and public deliberation. As observed by Elster (1998a),
The process ought to contain elements of both secrecy (committee discus-
sion) and publicity (plenary assembly discussions). With total secrecy, partisan
interests and logrolling come to the forefront, whereas full publicity encourages
13See Nurmi and Uusi-Heikkila¨ (1985), Wagner (1983, 1984) and Deb and Kelsey (1987). See (Nurmi,
1998, §3.2) or (Nurmi, 1999, §7.6) for summaries.
14See Greenberg (1979), McKelvey and Schofield (1986), Caplin and Nalebuff (1988, 1991), Weber (1993),
Banks (1995), and Saari (1997). See (Mueller, 2003, §5.8.2-5.8.3) for a summary.
15See e.g. Knight and Johnson (1994), Miller (1992, 2003), or Dryzek and List (2004).
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grandstanding and rhetorical overbidding. Conversely, secrecy allows for seri-
ous discussion, whereas publicity ensures that any deals struck are capable of
withstanding the light of day. (p.117)
Pyramidal democracy implements this private/public dichotomy. The members of a Tier
t node can discuss an issue in private, until they reach a consensus position. The node’s
delegate can then articulate this position within the more public context of a Tier (t+ 1)
node, where she must defend it against other delegates from other Tier t nodes, and
perhaps compromise until the Tier (t+ 1) tier node reaches some consensus. This process
iterates all the way up the pyramid. Deliberation within the Parliament will involve both
private discussions and public debates. Furthermore, each Parliament member must justify
her decisions in face-to-face dialogue with her constituents (who must then justify these
decisions to their constituents, and so on), so it will be difficult for her to betray the public
interest for personal gain.
Group Polarization. Self-assembled deliberative nodes are vulnerable to a phenomenon
Sunstein (2003) calls ‘group polarization’: ideologically similar individuals form an ‘enclave’
where they reinforce one another’s beliefs, causing the whole enclave to evolve towards a
more ideologically extreme position. A preponderance of divergent, extremist enclaves can
undermine the stability of the polity. Sunstein notes that this danger is greatest when
the enclaves evolve in isolation from one another. However, he observes that enclaves also
provide a space for marginalized political communities to articulate their views: “A special
advantage of... ‘enclave deliberation’ is that it promotes the development of positions that
would otherwise be invisible, silenced, or squelched by general debate. ...[m]any desirable
social movements have been made possible through this route” (p.94). He concludes: “It
is desirable to create spaces for enclave deliberation without insulating enclave members
from those with opposing views, and without insulating those outside of the enclave from
the views of those within it” (p.98).
Pyramidal democracy instantiates Sunstein’s suggestion: citizens can aggregate into
ideologically homogeneous nodes (‘enclaves’), where marginalized (perhaps extremist) ide-
ologies can flourish, but each nodes must send a delegate, who must deliberate and ulti-
mately compromise with the representatives of opposing views.
Implementation. Radical and utopian political schemes either founder upon the re-
sistance of vested interests, or unleash dangerously unpredictable consequences. For this
reason, most deliberative-democratic proposals are firmly embedded in the conventional
political framework. Pyramidal democracy is considerably more radical than many of
these proposals, and it would be both reckless and politically impossible to implement it
immediately in a large-scale polity. Instead, we propose to first test pyramidal democracy
in small and informal democratic settings, such as the governance of student groups, pri-
vate clubs, and professional associations. These ‘micropolities’ generally deal with rather
trivial matters, and there are ample exit opportunities for dissatisfied members if pyrami-
dal democracy spectacularly fails as a form of governance. (These polities also generally
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have high levels of voter apathy, but pyramidal democracy automatically adjusts to this:
apathetic voters simply remain in the lower tiers of the pyramid.)
If pyramidal democracy succeeds in these micropolities, the next target would be the
governance of publicly traded corporations. As first argued by Berle and Means (1932
[1968]), the widely dispersed shareholders of a large public firm actually have very little
real oversight or control, even though they exercise formal democratic discipline over the
management. We propose to replace the existing shareholder democracy with a pyramidal
democracy, where each shareholder receives a weight proportional to her share ownership.
The Parliament of this pyramid would act as the Board of Directors; it would appoint the
Officers of the firm, and would be consulted on major policy decisions.
For example, a firm having 75 = 16807 shares in circulation could form a pyramid
with five tiers, with each seven-member node at Tier k representing 7k−1 shares. A person
owning one share would begin in Tier 1, but a person owning more than 7 shares would
constitute a ‘node’ at Tier 1, and so could act as a delegate to Tier 2. Likewise, the owner
of more than 49 shares would automatically ascend to Tier 3, and the owner of more than
343 shares would ascend to Tier 4. The owner of more than 2401 shares (i.e. more than
one seventh of the entire firm) would automatically be the Tier 5 Parliament (which would
contain at most seven members).
Corporate governance provides a natural laboratory to tinker and experiment with pyra-
midal democracy, and limits the fallout from catastrophic failure: dissatisfied shareholders
can simple disinvest in a badly governed firm. If pyramidal democracy succeeds in this
setting, the next target would be municipal governments. Once pyramidal democracy has
been tested and perfected in these small polities, it could be introduced into larger polities
(e.g. regional or federal governments), first perhaps in an advisory role, but with gradually
increasing levels of control, until it entirely eclipsed conventional legislative institutions.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank David Ballantyne for first suggesting pyra-
midal democracy to me, and for many stimulating discussions. In many ways he is the
co-author of this article.
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